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Abstract 
The literature disagrees on the link between so-called busy boards (where many independent directors 
hold multiple board seats) and firm performance. Some argue that busyness certifies a director’s ability 
and that such directors are value enhancing. Others argue that “over-boarded” directors are ineffective 
and detract from firm value. We find evidence that (1) the disparate results in prior work stem from 
differences in both sample composition and empirical design, (2) on balance the results suggest a 
negative association between board busyness and firm performance, and (3) the inclusion of firm fixed 
effects dramatically affects the conclusions drawn from, and the explanatory power of, multivariate 
analyses. We also explore alternative empirical definitions of what constitutes a busy director and find 
that commonly used proxies for busyness perform well relative to more complex alternatives. 
Highlights 
► The disparate busy director findings result from different samples and methodology. ► Including 
firm fixed effects results in a constant negative relation. ► The common busy director definition is as 
informative as more intense alternatives. 
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1. Introduction 
The link between busy directors (independent directors with multiple board appointments) and firm 
performance is an issue of debate in the literature. Some argue that multiple directorships are a 
certification of a director’s abilities (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, busy directors should 
positively affect firm performance. Others argue that busy directors are less effective due to the 
increased time commitment associated with multiple board appointments. Therefore, the presence of 
directors with multiple board seats should negatively influence firm performance. 
Two of the more recent papers that exemplify this debate are Ferris et al., 2003, Fich and Shivdasani, 
2006. Ferris et al. (2003) finds that the past performance of the firms on which a director serves is 
positively associated with the number of board seats that he hold and that firms appointing a new 
director with multiple board seats experience positive announcement returns. These results suggest 
that the market perceives the appointment of an independent director with multiple board seats as 
value enhancing. In contrast, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms where directors have multiple 
board seats tend to have lower market to book ratios and are less likely to fire a CEO in response to 
poor performance. Furthermore, the announcement of a director accepting his or her third board seat 
negatively affects the value of other firms where the individual is a board member. Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) argue that directors with multiple appointments are busy; therefore, they are less able to 
effectively monitor and advise management, which adversely affects firm performance. This 
perspective is echoed by institutional investors proposing “best practices”, that would limit the 
number of board seats a director can hold. Reports further suggest that institutional investors are 
taking a harder stance against CEOs serving on multiple boards. More generally, time commitments for 
board members appear to be on the increase, with even one directorship taking an average time 
commitment of 228 hours in 2011, according to the National Association of Corporate Directors (see 
Lublin, 2012). 
We reexamine the impact of busy directors on firm performance, with emphasis on reconciling the 
contradictory findings in the literature. In addition to exploring alternate empirical approaches, we 
investigate whether or not the results are robust to more comprehensive definitions of what 
constitutes a busy director. Our goal is to reconcile the disparate findings in the literature and provide 
guidance for those examining board structure and busyness from an empirical standpoint. We 
acknowledge the omnipotent endogeneity concerns in this type of analysis and, while we do explore 
the direction of causality, our approach is to use representative analyses consistent with prior work in 
order to focus on the conflicting results.1 
Using a more recent sample we first revisit the results of Fich and Shivdasani, 2006, Ferris et al., 2003. 
Focusing on S&P 500, firms we find evidence of a negative association between busy directors and firm 
performance, consistent with Fich and Shivdasani’s (2006) analysis of the Forbes 500. However, when 
we examine a broader sample including non-S&P 500 firms, we find evidence of a positive link between 
busy directors and firm performance, consistent with Ferris et al. (2003) analysis of more than three 
thousand COMPUSTAT firms. Our ability to find results consistent with the findings of both Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006, Ferris et al., 2003 suggests that the conflicting findings are attributable to differences 
in the samples studied or other aspects of the empirical design. 
With regard to empirical design, Brookman and Thistle, 2011, Coles and Li, 2011, and Graham et al. 
(2012), highlight the importance of controlling for unobservable firm characteristics. These papers 
report that controlling for firm fixed effects changes previously documented relations in the CEO 
compensation literature. Thus, in the spirit of this work, and consistent with the approach of Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006), we also examine how the inclusion of firm fixed effects influences the empirical 
association between busy directors and firm performance. Furthermore, we explore how controlling 
for firm fixed effects impacts the overall explanatory power of our models. Finally, we explore whether 
the relation between busy directors and firm performance differs pre- and post-Sarbanes Oxley. 
Our results suggest that the contradictory findings in the literature are attributable to differences in 
both the samples studied and empirical design. Notably the inclusion or exclusion of smaller firms and 
firm fixed effects materially impacts the inferences drawn regarding busy directors. Specifically, when 
smaller firms are included in the sample we observe evidence of a positive relation between busy 
directors and firm performance. Once we control for firm fixed effects, we find a consistent negative 
relation between busy directors and firm performance, regardless of sample composition. Moreover, 
the adjusted-R2 of our models increases dramatically with the inclusion of firm fixed effects, suggesting 
that unobserved firm heterogeneity is also important in explaining the variation in firm performance. 
We also find evidence suggesting that busy boards lead to lower firm values, and that this association 
has weakened following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. 
Finally, we examine alternative measures of what constitutes a busy director and thus a busy board. 
We start with the definition that is increasingly used in the literature whereby an independent director 
serving on three or more boards is classified as busy.2 However we also explore different proxies for 
director busyness. Our alternative busyness measures are designed to account for the differential time 
and effort required to serve on the boards of different firms. For example, board service for a director 
on a small single-product line company may be less onerous than serving on the board of a fast 
growing and complex multinational corporation. 
We find evidence that the relatively straightforward definition of busy directors (and thus busy boards) 
is as informative as the more complex, and data intensive, alternatives that we examine. Specifically, 
we find relatively high correlations between the traditional definitions of board busyness and the 
alternatives that we construct. Additionally, the empirical relations we observe with the alternative 
measures are qualitatively similar to those of the traditional measures, and they have similar 
explanatory power. 
In Section 2 we review the relevant literature and highlight the disparate results. Section 3 outlines the 
data and variables used in the study while in Section 4 we report our primary findings. In Section 5 we 
explore alternative measures of director busyness. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
The evidence on the association between busy directors and firm value is mixed. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue that directors who demonstrate their ability as monitors are rewarded with additional 
board appointments. Consistent with this view, Brickley et al. (1999) find that the likelihood that a 
retired CEO sits on his own board or other boards is positively associated with the performance of his 
firm while he was CEO. More recently, Ferris et al. (2003) find that the better the performance of firms 
at which the director serves, the more likely the director is to hold more board seats going forward. 
Conversely, Gilson (1990) finds that directors at financially distressed firms hold fewer board seats in 
the future. Similarly, Shivdasani, 1993, Harford, 2003 report that outside directors at firms that are the 
target of a hostile takeover attempt hold fewer board seats going forward. The findings that directors 
associated with better performing firms hold more directorships, while those associated with poor 
performing firms hold fewer, are consistent with multiple board seats certifying director quality. 
Therefore, these results suggest a positive relation between busy directors and firm performance. 
Additional evidence consistent with the assertion that multiple directorships certify director quality can 
be found in Beasley, 1996, Cotter et al., 1997, Brown and Maloney, 1999, Ferris et al., 2003, amongst 
others. Beasley (1996) finds that firms whose outside directors hold more board seats are less likely to 
commit fraud. Cotter et al. (1997) report that when a merger target’s board includes individuals with 
multiple board seats, the merger premium offered is higher. Similarly, Brown and Maloney (1999) find 
higher acquirer returns when directors with multiple board seats serve on the acquirer’s board. Lastly, 
Ferris et al. (2003) report positive returns when firms announce the appointment of a director with 
multiple board seats. 
In contrast to the certification view, some researchers argue that directors over-commit themselves as 
they take on multiple board seats and this reduces their efficacy as advisors and monitors. Related to 
this, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) examine CEO involvement with the nomination of new directors 
and find that CEOs tend to select directors who (1) are predisposed to monitor management less and 
(2) have multiple board seats. Further, Core et al. (1999) report that CEO compensation is higher when 
outside directors hold multiple board seats, while Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms where the 
majority of outside directors have multiple board seats have worse performance and are less likely to 
fire a CEO for poor performance. More recently, Ahn et al. (2010) find that acquiring firms where 
directors hold more seats experience more negative acquisition announcement returns while Jiraporn 
et al. (2008) report larger diversification discounts when directors hold multiple board seats (an effect 
that is exacerbated at firms with weaker shareholder rights). 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) also find evidence of positive announcement returns when a busy director 
leaves a board, and they find that in response to news of a director accepting a third board seat, the 
incumbent firm experiences a negative announcement return. Additionally, Jiraporn et al. (2009) find 
that busier directors are more likely to miss board meetings, consistent with directors becoming over 
committed. Lastly, Jiraporn et al. (2009) find a U-shaped relationship between the number of board 
seats a director holds and the number of board committees he serves on. Specifically, when a director 
sits on a small number of boards, he serves on fewer committees suggesting, the director is busy. 
However, as a director sits on more boards, he serves on more committees, supporting the reputation 
hypothesis. 
The discussion above outlines the debate and highlights the contradictory results in the literature. Both 
views are intuitively appealing, and both have empirical support in the literature. We attempt to 
reconcile the findings in the prior literature by using a representative analysis of how firm value is 
associated with board structure. Specifically, we focus on how differences in experimental design 
influence the link between board busyness and firm value. In doing so, we focus on sample differences, 
the specific methodologies used, and various proxies for director busyness. 
3. Data 
3.1. Sample construction 
Using RiskMetrics, we obtain director and board-level data including name, age, ownership, board 
tenure, independence, committee appointments, and whether or not the director is a current CEO. 
Firm-level accounting and financial data are from COMPUSTAT, while stock market data are from 
Center for Research in Security Prices (hereafter CRSP). We exclude financial and utility firms and 
exclude observations where all the required data is not available. This results in a sample of 11,494 
firm-years from 1999–2008.3Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the firms in the sample. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable All firms S&P 500 firms Non-S&P 500 firms 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Firm characteristics 
Tobin’s Q 2.03 1.60 2.25 1.79 1.93 1.53 
Return on assets 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 
Return on sales 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.12 
Sales/assets 1.12 0.96 1.05 0.90 1.15 1.00 
Operating margin 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.12 
Total assets 6,059 1,344 17,231 7,039 1,372 792 
Total sales 4,851 1,305 12,978 6,307 1,441 804 
Board ownership 1.22 1.00 1.16 1.00 1.25 1.00 
Board size 8.94 9.00 10.50 10.00 8.29 8.00 
Variable All firms S&P 500 firms Non-S&P 500 firms 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Independent directors (%) 0.69 0.71 0.75 0.77 0.67 0.67 
Busy directors (%) 0.16 0.11 0.27 0.25 0.11 0.00 
Busy board 0.09 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Average # of directorships 1.62 1.50 1.99 1.88 1.47 1.33 
Firm age 22.76 16.00 34.71 32.00 17.75 13.00 
Number of segments 2.36 2.00 2.72 3.00 2.21 2.00 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics the firm and board characteristics. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the 
market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s 
assets and the book value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s 
assets at the end of the year. Return on assets is calculated as operating income before depreciation plus the 
decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other 
current assets scaled by the average of beginning- and ending-year book value of total assets. Return on sales is 
computed as operating income over net sales. Operating margin is estimated as annual operating income 
standardized by total assets. Total assets and total sales are those reported by Compustat at year-end. Board 
size is the firm’s total number of directors. Board ownership is a quintile ranking of the percent of the firm’s 
total outstanding equity held by the firm’s directors. Independent directors (%) is the number of independent 
directors divided by board size. Busy Directors (%) is the percentage of independent directors who are busy, 
Busy Board is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if a majority of the independent directors are busy, 
and zero otherwise. Average # of Directorships is the total number of directorships held by independent board 
members divided by the number of independent directors. Firm age is the number of years the firm has been in 
the CRSP database. Number of segments is the number of business segments reported by COMPUSTAT. 
Similar to Ferris et al. (2003), we report the distribution of directors in our sample based on the 
number of board seats they hold in Table 2. Consistent with Ferris et al. (2003) we see that the 
percentage of directors holding multiple seats falls as the number of seats held increases. For example, 
we find that 28.3% of directors hold two board seats, while less than 0.02% hold ten seats. Ferris et al. 
(2003) report that more than 84% of their director sample holds just one board seat; the 
corresponding statistics for our sample is 47.4%. That is, the majority of directors in our sample serve 
on multiple boards. We also note that directors who serve on the boards of S&P 500 companies are 
more likely to serve on multiple boards relative to non-S&P 500 directors. Specifically, we find that only 
35.4% of S&P directors hold a single board seat, while this percentage increases to 52.4% for non-S&P 
500 directors. 
Table 2. Distribution of directorships held. 
Directorships held All firms: Directors S&P 500 directors Non-S&P 500 directors 
1 5449 47.41% 1205 35.47% 4244 52.41% 
2 3255 28.32% 1034 30.44% 2221 27.43% 
3 1701 14.80% 677 19.93% 1024 12.65% 
4 701 6.10% 296 8.71% 405 5.00% 
5 245 2.13% 116 3.41% 129 1.59% 
Directorships held All firms: Directors S&P 500 directors Non-S&P 500 directors 
6 78 0.68% 37 1.09% 41 0.51% 
7 46 0.40% 20 0.59% 26 0.32% 
8 17 0.15% 11 0.32% 6 0.07% 
10 2 0.02% 1 0.03% 1 0.01% 
Total directors 11,494  3397  8097  
Number of firms 2077  532  1545  
Notes: We report the distribution of directors based on the number of directorships held. We report the number 
and percentage of individual directors holding the reported number of board seats for the full sample, the S&P 
500, and the non-S&P 500. 
3.2. Busy director proxies 
We use several different measures to capture the concept of director busyness. We classify these 
measures into two broad groups: (1) conventional measures used in the prior literature and (2) 
alternative measures that are designed to capture the nuances of busyness. We focus on independent 
directors as these directors are primarily responsible for monitoring management while inside 
directors are potentially on boards for other reasons.4 
The conventional busy measures we use are the Fich and Shivdasani (2006)Percentage of busy 
directors which is the percentage of independent directors that are busy, where a director is 
considered to be busy if he or she serves on three or more boards, and the Busy board indicator, which 
takes the value of 1 if over 50% of the firm’s independent directors are busy. Additionally, we calculate 
the Average number of directorships – the mean number of board seats held by independent directors 
– used by Ferris et al. (2003). These are relatively simple measures, treating all directorships the same. 
However, as noted earlier, one might expect that the demands on a director’s time will vary with the 
characteristics of the firms where the director serves. That is, board service for a director on a small 
single-product line company may be less onerous than serving on the board of a fast growing complex 
multinational corporation. Thus, our alternative proxies for busy are designed to account for the 
differential time and effort required to serve at different firms. 
We attempt to capture different firm and director characteristics that likely place greater demands on 
a director’s time. At a general level we focus on two dimensions: (1) the complexity of the firms at 
which the director serves and (2) additional time commitments that the individual may face. To proxy 
for complexity we focus on firm size, the number of business segments, and R&D intensity. Our priors 
are that these firm characteristics are associated with the time and effort required of the director to 
monitor and advise management. For time commitments we track whether or not the individual is a 
sitting executive at another S&P 1500 firm, serves on numerous board committees (as defined below), 
and whether or not the director serves on the boards of firms operating in different industries. Our 
expectation is that sitting executives will have less time available for monitoring and advising because 
of the requirements of their careers. Similarly, directors serving on numerous committees have less 
time available and this in turn impinges on their ability to monitor and advise management.5 Lastly, 
serving on the boards of firms in diverse industries require more effort in order for the director to 
remain informed on industry-specific developments across multiple industries. 
Our complexity measures are: Busy directors serving at a large firm (%) is the proportion of 
independent directors serving on three or more boards, where at least one of those firms has assets 
above the sample median; Busy directors serving firms with multiple business segments (%) is the 
fraction of independent directors serving on three or more boards, where at least one firm has more 
business segments than the sample median; Busy directors serving firms with large R&D expenditures 
(%) is the percentage of independent directors serving on three or more boards, where at least one 
firm has R&D expenditures above the sample median. Our time constraint measures are: Busy directors 
serving as insiders at their firm (%) is the percentage of independent directors serving on three or more 
boards, where they serve as an inside director on their employer’s board; Busy directors with multiple 
committees (%) is the percentage of independent directors serving on three or more boards who also 
serve on more than four committees (which is the median number of committee appointments for 
independent directors). Busy directors serving different industries (%) is the percentage of independent 
directors serving on three or more boards, where at least two firms are in different Fama–French 48 
industries. 
3.3. Dependent variables 
For purposes of comparison we generally follow the empirical approach of Fich and Shivdasani (2006). 
We focus primarily on the relation between busy directors and Tobin’s Q, but we also examine Return 
on Assets (ROA), Sales as a Percent of Assets, and Return on Sales (ROS). We calculate Tobin’s Q as the 
market value of the firm’s equity plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and 
equity, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets all measured at the end of the year.6 We calculate 
ROA as the sum of operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the 
decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets, 
divided by the average of the beginning and year end book value of total assets. Sales as a Percent of 
Assets is calculated as sales divided by the average of beginning and year end book value of total 
assets. Return on Sales is calculated as the sum of operating income before depreciation plus the 
decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and the decrease 
in other current assets, divided by sales. 
3.4. Control variables 
We control for: the natural log of the number of directorships held by the firm’s CEO; the presence of a 
director with industry expertise (specifically, a director who serves on at least three boards where the 
majority of the firms are in the same industry as the firm); director ownership; board interlocks (where 
the firm’s CEO sits on an outside director’s board); CEO ownership; the log of board size; the number of 
standing board committees; the percentage of independent directors; ROA; log sales; firm age; growth 
opportunities (measured as depreciation expense scaled by total sales) and the number of business 
segments. A detailed explanation of each of the variables we examine is presented in Appendix B. 
While we do not control for board meeting frequency, as meeting frequency is missing for 
approximately 16% of our sample, in unreported tests controlling for meeting frequency we obtain 
qualitatively similar results. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Tobin’s Q 
Table 3 reports the results of our multivariate analysis of the relation between busy directors and firm 
performance. Panel A presents evidence consistent with Ferris et al. (2003) that busy directors are 
associated with improved firm performance. Whether we examine the proportion of busy directors, 
the busy board indicator (Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Models 1 and 2), or average directorships (Ferris 
et al. (2003), Model 3), we find a positive association between busy directors and Tobin’s Q. This 
suggests that the cross-sectional results of Ferris et al. (2003) are robust to different proxies for 
director busyness and the use of samples from different time periods. 
Table 3. Busy directors and Tobin’s Q. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: All firms 
Board characteristics 
Busy directors (%) 0.456***   
Busy board (1/0)  0.160***  
Average # directorships   0.180***  
Control variables 
Board and firm controls (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No 
Adjusted R2 17.08% 16.76% 16.98%  
Panel B: S&P 500 firms 
Board characteristics 
Busy independent directors (%) −0.294***   
Busy board (1/0)  −0.130**  
Average # directorships   −0.091**  
Control variables 
Board and firm controls (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No 
Adjusted R2 36.83% 36.82% 36.86%  
Panel C: Non-S&P 500 firms 
Board characteristics 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Busy independent directors (%) 0.357***   
Busy board (1/0)  0.174**  
Average # directorships   0.152***  
Control variables 
Board and firm controls (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No 
Adjusted R2 (%) 18.89 18.70 18.79 
Notes: This table presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the association between busy directors and 
Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year plus the 
difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s equity at the end of the 
year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. Busy directors (%) is the percentage of 
independent directors that hold three or more directorships. Busy board (1/0) is an indicator variable equal to 
one if 50% or more of the board’s independent directors hold three or more directorships. Average # 
directorships is the total number of directorships held by the firm’s independent directors, divided by the 
number of independent directors. We control for year and industry fixed effects. A list of the other control 
variables used and details regarding their calculation is provided in Appendix B. Panel A presents the results for 
the full sample, while Panels B and C report the results for the S&P 500 and non-S&P-500 sub-samples 
respectively. 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level, respectively. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level, respectively. 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level, respectively. 
 
Of note, however, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) examine a panel of Fortune 500 firms between 1989 and 
1995, while Ferris et al. (2003) analysis is of a cross-section of more than 3000 COMPUSTAT firms in 
1995. Thus, it is possible that the different sample selection procedure accounts for the disparate 
empirical findings. We explore this possibility in Panels B and C of Table 3 where we split the sample 
into S&P 500 firms (Panel B) and non-S&P 500 firms (Panel C). In Panel B we see that Tobin’s Q is 
inversely related to the presence of busy directors for S&P 500 firms, consistent with Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006). However, in Panel C for the non-S&P 500 firms, the opposite is true – that is, 
consistent with the Ferris et al. (2003) findings, there is a positive association between busy directors 
and Tobin’s Q. 
Our ability to replicate the results of these two papers by splitting the sample based on S&P 500 
membership (to approximate the different sample selection methodologies of the two papers) 
suggests a possible explanation for the different conclusions. Namely, that the relation between busy 
directors and firm performances is contingent on the type of firm examined. Additionally, our results 
suggest a possible explanation as to why Fich and Shivdasani (2006) were unable to reproduce the 
Ferris et al. (2003) findings. Ferris et al. (2003) examines a sample that is dominated by smaller non-
Fortune 500 (and non-S&P 500) firms, for which our results suggest a positive relation between busy 
directors and performance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) examine only Fortune 500 companies, where 
our results suggest a negative relation between busy directors and performance for similar firms. The 
focus on larger companies by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) likely precluded them from finding evidence 
of a negative relation between busy directors and performance. While our results suggest the 
importance of sample selection for the previously documented findings, we note that the results of 
both papers are robust in the sense that we can replicate them for a more recent time period. 
Of course, the use of different empirical approaches may also be important in explaining the different 
results from these papers. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argue that fixed effects analysis offers more 
reliable estimates. Consistent with this, Brookman and Thistle, 2011, Coles and Li, 2011, and Graham et 
al. (2012), suggest the need to control for unobservable firm characteristics when analyzing corporate 
finance issues. Specifically, these papers find that including firm fixed effects alters previously 
documented results when examining CEO pay. 
Table 4 presents the results of our analysis when we include firm fixed effects. Panel A reports results 
for the full sample and Panels B and C report the results for the S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 samples, 
respectively. Once we control for firm fixed effects, we find a consistent negative relation between 
busy directors and firm performance, regardless of the sample examined or the busy director proxy 
used. These results demonstrate the importance of controlling for firm fixed effects. Absent a control 
for fixed effects, the relation between busy directors and firm performance appears to be sample 
specific. However, once we control for firm fixed effects, we find a consistent negative relation 
between busy directors and performance. Additionally, we note the significant increase in our adjusted 
R2. The inclusion of fixed effects increases our explanatory power by 100–300%. 
Table 4. Busy directors and Tobin’s Q controlling for firm-fixed effects. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: All firms    
Board characteristics 
Busy directors (%) −0.145**   
Busy board (1/0)  −0.019  
Average # directorships   −0.054**  
Control variables 
Board and firm controls (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 68.54% 68.53% 68.54%  
Panel B: S&P 500 firms 
Board characteristics 
Busy independent directors (%) −0.324***   
Busy board (1/0)  −0.085*  
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Average # directorships   −0.083*  
Control variables 
Board and firm controls (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 72.69% 72.69% 72.74%  
Panel C: Non-S&P 500 firms 
Board characteristics 
Busy independent directors (%) −0.206**   
Busy board (1/0)  −0.102*  
Average # directorships   −0.109***  
Control variables 
Board and firm controls (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 (%) 70.66 70.63 70.63 
Notes: This table presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the association between busy directors and 
Tobin’s Q controlling for firm-fixed effects. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the 
end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s 
equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. Busy directors 
(%) is the percentage of independent directors that hold three or more directorships. Busy board (1/0) is an 
indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more of the board’s independent directors hold three or more 
directorships. Average # directorships is the total number of directorships held by the firm’s independent 
directors, divided by the number of independent directors. We control for year and industry fixed effects. A list 
of the other control variables used and details regarding their calculation is provided in Appendix B. Panel A 
presents the results for the full sample, while Panels B and C report the results for the S&P 500 and non-S&P-
500 sub-samples respectively. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level respectively. 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level respectively. 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level respectively. 
 
While the coefficients on our busy director measures are all negative, the busy board indicator is not 
statistically significant in the full sample analysis but is significant in both sub-samples. This is 
somewhat surprising but is potentially explained by a structural break between the two sub-samples.7 
That is, while busy boards are negatively associated with firm performance in both sub-samples, the 
full sample analysis fails to control for the structural differences between S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 
firms. 
We examine the economic significance of this relation by focusing on the subsample analyses 
presented in Table 4 Panels B and C; we estimate the change to average Tobin’s Q for each 
specification. We find that, from Model 1, if one non-busy independent director was to become busy, 
then Tobin’s Q would decline by approximately 1.98% for the S&P 500 and 1.93% for the non-S&P 500 
firms. In Model 2, if the board were to become busy, it would result in a decline of 3.78% and 5.28% for 
the S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 firms, respectively. Finally, based on Model 3, if the average number of 
directorships were to increase by one then, the decline in Tobin’s Q would be 3.69% and 5.65% for the 
S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 firms, respectively. 
4.2. Sarbanes–Oxley 
Jiraporn et al. (2009) report that busy directors’ behavior has changed since the passage of Sarbanes–
Oxley (SOX) in 2002 in that they are less likely to miss board meetings post-SOX. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that the relation between busy directors and firm performance might also have 
changed post-SOX. We address this issue in Table 5. Following Jiraporn et al. (2009) we create a post-
SOX indicator variable, which we interact with our busyness proxies.8 While we find that busy directors 
and Tobin’s Q are negatively related, we find some evidence suggesting that the relation has weakened 
post-SOX. Specifically, the interaction between the average number of directorships and the post-SOX 
indicator is significantly positive, while the busy independent director (%) and busy board interactions 
are both positive and insignificant. This is consistent with the Jiraporn et al. (2009) assertion that SOX 
has motivated directors to act more responsibly. 
Table 5. Busy directors and Tobin’s Q: pre and post-SOX. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Board characteristics 
Busy independent directors (%) −0.236***   
Busy independent directors (%)⁎ post-SOX 0.103   
Busy board (1/0)  −0.045  
Busy board (1/0)⁎ post-SOX  0.019  
Average # directorships rectors   −0.095*** 
Average # directorships ⁎ post-SOX   0.056***  
Control variables 
Board and firm characteristics (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 (%) 67.44 67.41 67.48 
Notes: This table presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the association between busy directors and 
Tobin’s Q controlling for firm-fixed effects. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the 
end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s 
equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. Busy directors 
(%) is the percentage of independent directors that hold three or more directorships. Busy board (1/0) is the 
indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more of the board’s independent directors hold three or more 
directorships. Average # directorships is the total number of directorships held by the firm’s independent 
directors, divided by the number of independent directors. We control for year and industry fixed effects. A list 
of the other control variables used and details regarding their calculation is provided in Appendix B. Panel A 
presents the results for the full sample, while Panels B and C report the results for the S&P 500 and non-S&P-
500 sub-samples respectively. 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level, respectively. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level, respectively. 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level, respectively. 
 
4.3. Causality 
The results presented in Table 4, Table 5 suggest that busy directors are over committed, limiting their 
ability to monitor and advise management, which diminishes firm performance. However, the results 
do not allow us to identify causality. Busy directors may lead to lower Tobin’s Q, as argued by the 
literature, or firms with lower Tobin’s Q may appoint more busy directors to their boards in order to 
implement change. To explore the direction of causality we use an approach analogous to that of 
Jiraporn et al. (2009). Specifically, we replace our busyness proxies with their respected lagged values 
and re-estimate the analysis in Panel A of Table 4 using 1, 2, and 3 year lags. The rationale is that 
director busyness in prior years could not have been caused by the firm’s Tobin’s Q in subsequent 
years.9 
The untabulated results are consistent with those reported in Panel A of Table 4 in that we find 
negative relations between busyness and Tobin’s Q. Specifically, busy independent director (%) and 
average directorships held by independent directors are significantly negative, while the coefficient for 
the busy board indicator is negative but insignificant. On balance, these results lend support to the 
contention that busy directors detract from firm performance. 
4.4. Alternative performance measures 
The analysis above suggests that busy directors are negatively associated with firm performance. 
However, the analysis relies on Tobin’s Q, which potentially suffers from significant measurement 
error. To ensure that our results are not driven by issues with Tobin’s Q, we supplement our analysis by 
examining several alternative measures of firm performance. Following Fich and Shivdasani (2006) we 
examine return on assets, sales as a percent of assets and return on sales. In Table 6 we limit our 
analysis to the full sample and control for firm fixed effects, although we obtain qualitatively similar 
results in both the S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 sub-samples (not tabled). 
Table 6. Busy directors and operating performance. 
Variables ROA Sales/assets ROS 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Busy independent 
directors (%) −0.009
*   −0.053***   −0.023**   
Busy board (1/0)  −0.005**   −0.007   −0.01**  
Average # 
directorships 
  −0.004*   −0.018***   −0.008** 
 
Variables ROA Sales/assets ROS 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Control variables 
Board and firm 
characteristics (Fich 
and Shivdasani, 2006) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 (%) 77.71 77.71 77.70 92.93 92.93 92.93 77.99 77.99 77.99 
Notes: This table presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the association between busy directors and 
firm performance using alternative firm performance proxies. Return on assets is calculated as operating income 
before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, 
and the decrease in other current assets scaled by the average of beginning- and ending-year book value of total 
assets. Sales/assets is total sales divided by total assets. Return on sales is computed as operating income over 
net sales. Busy directors (%) is the percentage of independent directors that hold three or more directorships. 
Busy board (1/0) is an indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more of the board’s independent directors hold 
three or more directorships. Average # directorships is the total number of directorships held by the firm’s 
independent directors divided by the number of independent directors. We control for year-, industry-, and firm 
fixed-effects. A list of the other control variables used and details regarding their calculation is provided in 
Appendix B. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level, respectively. 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level, respectively. 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level, respectively. 
 
We see that all of the busy director proxies are negatively and significantly related to both ROA and 
ROS. While all three busy director proxies are negatively related to sales as a percent of assets, the 
busy board indicator is not statistically significant. The results presented in Table 6 suggest that busy 
directors are negatively related to firm performance, and that our previously observed relation is not 
driven by issues with Tobin’s Q. 
5. Alternative measures of director busyness 
5.1. Alternative board seat thresholds 
The analysis thus far follows the prior literature and assumes that directors become busy when they sit 
on three or more boards. We now examine how changing this definition of director busyness impacts 
the relation between busy directors and firm performances. Specifically, we reclassify directors as busy 
if they (1) serve on two or more boards or (2) four or more boards. Using these various classifications 
of busy directors, we re-estimate the relation between busy directors and firm performance. 
Moreover, we focus our analysis on the percentage of busy directors as it provides more consistent 
results than the busy board indicator or the average number of directorships.10 
These results, presented in Table 7, suggest that the negative association between busy directors and 
firm performance is strongest when the definition of busy is a director serving on three or more 
boards. When we use the two board seat cutoff, the percentage of busy independent directors is only 
significantly related to sales as a percent of assets. Using the four board seat cutoff, the percentage of 
busy directors is only significantly related to Tobin’s Q and ROS. While using the three boards cut off, 
the percentage of busy directors is significantly negatively related to all of our firm performance 
measures. This suggests that classifying directors on three or more boards as busy is robust from an 
empirical perspective. 
Table 7. Firm Performance Regressions with alternative thresholds for busyness. 
Model Measures of busy independent directors Dependent variables 
   
  Tobin’s Q ROA Sales/assets ROS 
 Busy directors (⩾2) (%) −0.049 −0.006 −0.035** −0.004 
 Control variables     
(1) Board and firm characteristics (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) 
    
 Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 Year and Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 Adjusted R2 (%) 68.53 77.71 92.93 77.97  
 Busy directors (⩾3) (%) −0.145** −0.009* −0.053*** −0.023** 
 Control variables     
(2) Board and firm characteristics (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) 
    
 Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 Year and industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 Adjusted R2 (%) 68.54 77.71 92.93 77.99  
 Busy directors (⩾4) (%) −0.207** −0.007 −0.018 −0.025* 
 Control variables     
(3) Board and firm characteristics (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) 
    
 Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 Year and Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Adjusted R2 (%) 68.54 77.70 92.93 77.98 
Notes: This table presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the association between busy directors and 
firm performance using alternative definitions of what constitutes a busy director. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the 
market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s 
assets and the book value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s 
assets at the end of the year. Return on assets is calculated as operating income before depreciation plus the 
decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other 
current assets scaled by the average of beginning- and ending-year book value of total assets. Sales/assets is 
total sales divided by total assets. Return on sales is computed as operating income over net sales. Busy 
directors (%) is the percentage of independent directors that hold: (1) Two or more directorships in Model 1, (2) 
three or more directorships in Model 2, and (3) four or more directorships in Model 3. We control for year-, 
industry-, and firm-fixed effects. A list of the other control variables used and details regarding their calculation 
is provided in Appendix B. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level, respectively. 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level, respectively. 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level, respectively. 
 
5.2. Complexity and commitment measures 
To identify busy directors, the prior literature focuses exclusively on the number of directorships an 
individual holds: Core et al., 1999, Ferris et al., 2003, Fich and Shivdasani, 2006, Jiraporn et al., 2008, 
Jiraporn et al., 2009, Jiraporn et al., 2009, Ahn et al., 2010. While this is an intuitive approach, it fails to 
address the possibility that the demands placed on a director are different across firms. For example, 
all else equal, complex firms (i.e. those with many business segments) are more likely to require more 
time and effort from their directors than a firm with only a single business segment. Therefore, if two 
directors both serve on three boards, but one director serves on the board of more complex firms and 
all else is equal, then this director is busier. 
Surprisingly, these various dimensions of busyness have not been addressed in-depth in prior work. 
Thus, in this section we explore how alternative busyness measures designed to capture variation in 
the time and effort needed to monitor and advise management are associated with each other and 
with firm performance. The alternative measures we examine focus on (1) variation in the complexity 
of the firms and (2) additional time constraints placed on the directors. To account for complexity, we 
focus on whether directors serve at large firms, firms with multiple business segments, or firms with 
large R&D expenditures. To account for time constraints, we see if directors serve as inside directors at 
their own firm, have multiple committee obligations, or serve on the boards of firms in different 
industries. 
Table 8 presents the correlation matrix between all of our busyness measures, while Table 9 presents 
the analysis of how our alternative busyness proxies are associated with firm performance. The results 
in Table 8 demonstrate that the alternative busyness measures are highly correlated with each other 
and with those used in the prior literature. This suggests that they may add little in explaining firm 
performance. The results presented in Table 9 are consistent with this notion. Specifically, we find that 
all of the busyness measures have a negative association with Tobin’s Q. The adjusted R2 suggests that 
the model specifications using the simple measures from the prior literature have just as much 
explanatory power as the more complex alternatives that we examine here, which are more complex, 
data intensive, and time consuming to construct. 
Table 8. Correlation matrix. 
Variables Pearson correlation coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Busy directors (%) 1.00         
(2) Busy board (1/0) 0.71 1.00        
(3) Average # directorships 0.90 0.65 1.00       
(4) Busy directors serving large firms (%) 0.95 0.69 0.88 1.00      
(5) Busy directors serving firms with multiple business 
segments (%) 0.92 0.66 0.86 0.90 1.00 
    
(6) Busy directors serving firms with large R&D 
expenditures (%) 0.89 0.64 0.82 0.85 0.84 1.00 
   
(7) Busy directors serving different industry (%) 0.94 0.69 0.87 0.92 0.89 0.83 1.00   
(8) Busy directors with multiple committees (%) 0.81 0.61 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.79 1.00  
(9) Busy directors serving as insiders at their firm (%) 0.53 0.39 0.47 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.29 1.00 
Notes: This table presents the correlations between the various measures of busy directors. Busy directors (%) is 
the percentage of independent directors that hold three or more directorships. Busy board (1/0) is the indicator 
that sets equal to one if 50% or more of the board’s independent directors hold three or more directorships. 
Average # directorships is the total number of directorships held by all of a firm’s independent directors, divided 
by the number of independent directors. Busy directors serving large firms (%) is the fraction of independent 
directors that serves on at least one firm whose total assets is above the sample median in the year. Busy 
directors serving firms with multiple business segments (%) is the fraction of independent directors that serve 
on at least one firm with more business segments than the median in the sample for the year. Busy directors 
serving firms with large R&D expenditures (%) is the fraction of independent directors that serve on at least one 
firm’s whose R&D expenditures are above the median in a year. Busy directors with multiple committees (%) is 
the fraction of busy directors that serve on four or more committees. Busy directors serving different industry 
(%) is the fraction of independent directors that serve on firms in at least two Fama–French 48 industries. Busy 
directors serving as insiders at their firm (%) is the fraction of independent directors that are an insider on their 
own firm’s board. 
Table 9. Firm performance regressions with alternative measures of busy directors. 
Model Measures of busy independent directors Dependent Variables 
  Tobin’s 
Q ROA Sales/Assets ROS 
(1) Busy directors (%) −0.145** −0.009* −0.053*** −0.023** 
 Adjusted R2 (%) 68.54 77.71 92.93 77.99  
(2) Busy board (1/0) −0.019 −0.005** −0.007 −0.01** 
 Adjusted R2 (%) 68.53 77.71 92.93 77.99  
(3) Average # directorships −0.054** −0.004* −0.018*** −0.008** 
 Adjusted R2 (%) 68.54 77.71 92.93 77.99  
(4) Busy directors serving large firms (%) −0.177** −0.009* −0.03 −0.025** 
Model Measures of busy independent directors Dependent Variables 
  Tobin’s 
Q ROA Sales/Assets ROS 
 Adjusted R2 (%) 68.55 77.71 92.93 77.99  
(5) Busy directors serving firms with multiple business segments (%) −0.232
*** −0.008 −0.043** −0.012 
 Adjusted R2 (%) 68.56 77.70 92.93 77.98  
(6) Busy directors serving firms with large R&D expenditures (%) −0.084 −0.009
* −0.056*** −0.02* 
 Adjusted R2 (%) 68.53 77.71 92.93 77.98  
(7) Busy directors with multiple committees (%) −0.174** −0.006 −0.031 −0.023** 
 Adjusted R2 (%) 68.54 77.70 92.93 77.98  
(8) Busy directors serving different industry (%) −0.207*** −0.007 −0.037* −0.028*** 
 Adjusted R2 68.56 77.70 92.93 77.99  
(9) Busy directors serving as insiders at their firm (%) −0.252* −0.015 −0.014 −0.011 
 Adjusted R2 (%) 68.54 77.71 92.92 77.98 
Notes: This table presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the effect of busy directors on firm 
performance, using various proxies for busy directors and controlling for firm-fixed effects. Tobin’s Q is 
calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the book 
value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year, divided by the book 
value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. Return on assets is calculated as operating income before 
depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and 
the decrease in other current assets scaled by the average of beginning- and ending-year book value of total 
assets. Sales/assets is total sales divided by total assets. Return on sales is computed as operating income over 
net sales. Busy directors (%) is the percentage of independent directors that hold three or more directorships. 
Busy board (1/0) is an indicator equal to one if 50% or more of the board’s independent directors hold three or 
more directorships. Average # directorships is the total number of directorships held by all of a firm’s 
independent directors, divided by the number of independent directors. Busy directors serving large firms (%) is 
the fraction of independent directors that serve on at least one firm whose total assets is above the sample 
median in the year. Busy directors serving firms with multiple business segments (%) is the fraction of 
independent directors that serve on at least one firm with more business segments than the median in the 
sample for the year. Busy directors serving firms with large R&D expenditures (%) is the fraction of independent 
directors that serve on at least one firm’s whose R&D expenditures are above the median in a year. Busy 
directors with multiple committees (%) is the fraction of busy directors that serve on four or more committees. 
Busy directors serving different industry (%) is the fraction of independent directors that serve on firms in at 
least two Fama–French 48 industries. Busy directors serving as insiders at their firm (%) is the fraction of 
independent directors that are an insider on their own firm’s board. We control for year and industry fixed 
effects A list of the other control variables used as well as details regarding their calculations is provided in 
Appendix B. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level, respectively. 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level, respectively. 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level, respectively. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Prior work has documented both positive and negative relations between busy directors and firm 
value. We attempt to reconcile these disparate results in the literature and explore whether or not 
more comprehensive definitions of what constitutes a busy director affects inferences regarding this 
association. In doing so, we focus on a more recent sample and find evidence consistent with the prior 
literature. Specifically, when focusing on larger firms, namely S&P 500 firms, we find evidence of a 
negative association between the presence of busy directors and firm performance. This is consistent 
with Fich and Shivdasani’s (2006) analysis of the Forbes 500. However, when studying a larger sample 
including non-S&P 500 firms, we find evidence that the presence of busy directors is positively related 
to firm performance, consistent with Ferris et al. (2003). Our ability to find results consistent with both 
Fich and Shivdasani, 2006, Ferris et al., 2003 suggests that the conflicting findings of these papers are 
potentially the result of differences in the samples studied. 
However, the specific empirical approach used may also account for differences. Indeed, following the 
arguments of Fich and Shivdasani, 2006, Brookman and Thistle, 2011, Coles and Li, 2011, and Graham 
et al. (2012), once we control for firm fixed effects, we find a consistent negative relation between 
busy directors and firm performance, regardless of the sample examined. Our finding of a consistent 
negative association between busy directors and firm performance across samples in this analysis 
reinforces the need for researchers to control for firm fixed effects in such analyses. Failing to control 
for unobservable firm characteristics can result in a mis-specified model and potentially incorrect 
inferences. Our results are also suggestive of causality running from busy board to (lower) firm value. 
Furthermore, we find evidence that the link has weakened post-Sarbanes–Oxley. 
Lastly, we examine whether or not the definition of what constitutes a busy director affects the 
empirical association between busy directors and performance. Specifically, we examine alternatives 
to the three board seat as a cutoff for busyness, proxies that account for the complexity of the firms 
where the director serves, and time commitments. Our findings suggest that the relatively 
straightforward definition used in the prior literature of a busy director as serving on three or more 
boards, is appropriate and as informative as the more complex and data-intensive proxies that we 
examine. This implies that future researchers can avoid the data collection and cleaning associated 
with the busyness measures we examine and focus on the relatively straightforward proxy used in the 
prior literature. 
Appendix A. Sample construction 
A.1. RiskMetrics 
Our primary data source is RiskMetrics, which we obtain through ISS Governance Services. While the 
data was initially provided by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), ISS acquired 
RiskMetrics in 2005. Following the acquisition, in 2007 the methodology used for data collection was 
changed. Thus, RiskMetrics provides two datasets: (1) the legacy version, covering 1996–2006, which 
was collected using the old IRRC methodology and (2) the current version starting in 2007, that follows 
the new ISS methodology. This change in the methodology reduced the number of variables collected. 
The legacy version contained 79 variables while the current version contains only 64 variables. 
Additionally, some data item names where changed, as was how some data was recorded.11 Combining 
the two versions of the RiskMetrics dataset provides us with a sample of 193,467 director-year level 
observations for which we have 61 variables in common across the two datasets. 
We remove 20 observations from this sample as they appear to be duplicate observations. 
Additionally, we remove all observations for P-COM 1999, as a board and director information across 
years is constant. Due to the use of lagged variable, the sample period is between 1999 and 2008 and 
there are 145,778 director-year observations and 15,501 firm-year observations. 
A.2. Company IDs 
RiskMetrics provides three company identifiers that can potentially be used to match with other 
databases: six-digit CUSIP number, ticker, and company name. Of these three, the CUSIP is generally 
regard as the more reliable for matching across databases. However, the CUSIP contains missing 
observations, as well as coding errors. Specifically, the six digit CUSIP used in RiskMetrics is supposed 
be the first six numbers in the standard eight digit CUSIP, but we find coding errors in this field. In 
addition to the three general company identifiers, RiskMetrics provides several internal company 
identifiers. The legacy version contains legacy_pps_id, and rt_id (for the period following RiskMetrics’s 
acquisition by ISS), while the current version provides company_id, and rt_id. Unfortunately, none of 
these identifiers uniquely identifies companies in the combined version of RiskMetrics. The specific 
problem is that no single identifier covers all of a firm’s observations within the dataset. Therefore, we 
create our own unique company identifier within RiskMetrics, coid. Assuming that each internal 
identifier correctly identifies specific firm observations, we combine the three identifiers into a unique 
company id. We start by setting coid to rt_id, we then fill in missing values for coid by expanding rt_id 
to any observation that shares a legacy_pps_id. We then repeat this process using company_id. This 
process successfully identifies all observations in our sample. We next merge our RiskMetrics data to 
CRSP and Compustat. 
This is not a simple matching procedure as the RiskMetrics identifier appears to change. Therefore, we 
follow the methodology listed below. 
1.  Match observations based on six-digit CUSIP, ticker, and year. 
2.  Match remaining observations based on six-digit CUSIP and year. 
3.  Match remaining observations based on ticker and year. 
However, this may result in multiple permnos for an individual company. To identify a unique permno 
for each company: 
1.  If all permnos cover the entire sample period, we select the permno with the highest trading 
volume. 
2.  If the permnos are mutually exclusive, we assume each is correct 
3.  If the permnos are not mutually exclusive, we assign the permno with the longest time 
covered as the firm’s permno. 
4.  We manually identify the 79 firm-years that this methodology fails to identify. 
A.3. Director-level information 
In addition to creating a unique firm identifier, we also correct coding errors in the director-level 
information. Director information, such as gender, should remain constant. Similarly, the year a 
director’s tenure at a firm started should remain constant. To correct for these types of 
inconsistencies, we perform the following steps: (1) extract all observations with missing and 
inconsistent values, (2) if an observation has missing values but the rest of the observations provide 
consistent values, then replace the missing observation with the consistent value, (3) if the values are 
inconsistent through a director (or director-firm), replace the inconsistent values with the value that 
appears the most frequently. Any inconsistencies remaining after these steps are manually corrected.12 
A.4. CEO information 
Riskmetrics does not explicitly identify a firm’s CEO. For the majority of firms we are able to identify a 
firm’s CEO by combining the inside director indicator and the insider position variables. When this 
criterion fails to identify the firm’s CEO, we use the following criteria: If a firm has only one insider on 
the board, we classify that director as the CEO. Alternatively, we classify inside directors that are the 
chairman of the board as the CEO. If we are still unable to identify the CEO, we use EXECUCOMP, and 
proxy statements to identify the CEO. After checking proxy statements, we are unable to identify the 
CEO for 55 firm-year observations. We drop these observations from the sample. 
Appendix B. Variable definitions 
Dependent variables  
Tobin’s Q 
The market value of the firm’s equity plus the difference between the book 
value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s equity, divided by 
the book value of the firm’s assets. All data is from year end 
ROA 
The sum of operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in 
receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and 
the decrease in other current assets, divided by the average of the beginning 
and year end book value of total assets 
Sales as a percent of 
assets Sales divided by total assets 
ROS 
The sum of operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in 
receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and 
the decrease in other current assets, divided sales  
Busyness variables  
Conventional  
Busy director (%) The percentage of independent directors who hold three or more directorships 
Busy boards An indicator set to 1 if over 50% of the board’s independent directors are busy 
Average # directorships The total number of directorships held by independent directors, divided by the number of independent directors  
Alternative  
Busy director serving a 
large firm 
The proportion of directors serving on three or more boards, where at least 
one firm has assets above the sample median 
Busy director serving a 
firm with multiple 
segments 
The fraction of directors serving on three or more boards, where at least one 
firm has more business segments than the sample median 
Busy director serving a 
firm with large R&D 
expenditures 
The fraction of directors serving on three or more boards, where at least one 
firm has R&D expenditures above the sample median 
Busy director serving as 
an insider at own firm 
The proportion of directors serving on three or more boards, when they also 
serve as an inside director on their company’s board 
Busy director with 
multiple committees 
The fraction of directors serving on three or more boards who also serve on 
more than four committees, which is the median number of committee 
appointments for an independent director 
Busy director serving in 
multiple industries 
The fraction of directors serving on three or more boards, where at least two 
firms are in different Fama-French 48 industries  
Control variables  
Log (CEO Directorships) The natural logarithm of the number of directorships held by the CEO. 
Industry director (%) The percentage of busy directors with at least 50% of their directorships in the same Fama-French 48 industry code 
Director ownership Quintile measure of the combined board’s voting control, excluding the CEO 
Board interlock An indicator which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s CEO sits on the board of one of the independent director’s firms 
CEO ownership The percentage of voting power that the CEO controls 
Log(board size) The natural logarithm of the total number of directors on the firm’s board 
Board committees The number of board committees. 
Independent director 
(%) The percentage of independent directors on the board 
Log (sales) Log of total sales 
Firm age The number of years the firm is in the CRSP database 
Growth opportunities Depreciation expense scaled by total sales 
Business segments The number of business segments reported in COMPUSTAT 
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1See Wintoki et al. (2012) for a discussion of issues pertaining to endogeneity and the advantages and 
disadvantages of standard empirical approaches used in empirical governance analyses. 
2The three boards cutoff is commonly used in the literature and is consistent with best-practice 
recommendations; for example, the National Association of Corporate Directors and the 
Council for Institutional Investors, both suggest that directors limit their board appointments. 
3A detailed description of the data matching procedure and steps taken to clean the data is provided in 
Appendix A. 
4In unreported tests we calculate the busyness measures for all directors and re-run our analysis. The 
results are qualitatively similar. 
5These arguments are consistent with those of Jiraporn et al. (2009) who study busy directors and 
committee membership. 
6The Tobin’s Q calculation is also consistent with Coles et al. (2008), Guner et al. (2008), and Adams et 
al. (2005). 
7This type of situation is known as a Simpson’s Paradox, a detailed explanation of which can be found 
in Samuels, 1993, Scarsini and Spizzichino, 1999. 
8We follow the suggestion of Jiraporn et al. (2009) and remove 2002 from the sample. We note that we 
receive qualitatively similar results when we include 2002. 
9The use of firm fixed effects prevents us from using the earliest values for our measures of busyness. 
10We note that we obtain similar results with these proxies as well. 
11The variable name for whether a director is a nominating committee chair is different (nomchair in 
the legacy version and Nom_chair in the current version). Also, the indicator of whether a 
director owns less than 1% of voting power (ownless1) is recorded as 1 or 0 in the legacy 
version and ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in the current version of RiskMetrics. 
12As for age, female, country_of_empl, dirsince, and classification, we correct 22, 64, 222, 52, and 10 
director-firm-year observations, respectively. 
 
